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WHEN GOOD CONFLICT GETS BETTER AND BAD CONFLICT BECOMES 
WORSE: THE ROLE OF SOCIAL CAPITAL IN THE CONFLICT–INNOVATION 
RELATIONSHIP  
 
ABSTRACT 
This research investigates the moderating effect of social capital on the conflict–innovation 
relationship and poses the argument that social interaction amplifies the beneficial effect of task 
conflict and the harmful effect of relationship conflict, whereas trust suppresses these effects. 
The results of the hypotheses tests with a sample of 232 Canadian-based firms demonstrate that 
at higher levels of social interaction, the positive relationship between task conflict and 
innovation is stronger, and so is the negative relationship between relationship conflict and 
innovation. Furthermore, at higher levels of trust, the positive relationship between task conflict 
and innovation weakens. This study adds to the emerging contingency perspective pertaining to 
the study of conflict and provides a more nuanced view of the beneficial role of intra-
organizational social capital for innovation. 
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Developing new products and services or entering new markets requires exchanges 
among marketing, R&D, and other functional departments that accommodate different 
viewpoints and promote healthy working relationships (De Luca and Atuahene-Gima 2007; 
Griffin and Hauser 1996; Li and Calantone 1998; Lovelace et al. 2001). Not surprisingly, 
conflict—that is, the perceived incompatibilities or disagreements among exchange partners—is 
unavoidable in such settings (Jehn 1995, 1997; Song et al. 2006), and a common distinction 
differentiates task and relationship conflict. In the context of cross-functional collaboration, task 
conflict pertains to disagreements between functional departments about ideas and opinions 
pertaining to a particular task and thus captures contrasting perspectives about specific issues 
(Amason and Sapienza 1997). In contrast, relationship conflict pertains to personality clashes 
between people in different departments and is characterized by negative feelings such as 
tension, annoyance, frustration, and irritation (Jehn and Mannix 2001).  
An emerging view argues that in the context of organizational innovation—defined as the 
extent to which a firm’s strategic posture is directed toward the development of new products 
and services or entry in new markets (Jansen et al. 2006; Uzzi and Lancaster 2003)—task 
conflict plays a positive role because it stimulates original and divergent viewpoints (Van Dyne 
and Saavedra 1996). In contrast, relationship conflict harms innovation because the associated 
negative emotions distract attention from high-quality knowledge exchanges and decision 
making (Amason 1996; Jehn 1995; Jehn and Mannix 2001; Pelled et al. 1999). The theoretical 
elaboration of these contrasting roles typically focuses on identifying the antecedents of the two 
conflict types (e.g., Matsuo 2006; Peterson and Behfar 2003; Porter and Lilly 1996) or 
determining how factors such as conflict-handling mechanisms (Song et al. 2006), collaborative 
problem solving (De Dreu 2006), or trust (e.g., Langfred 2007; Rispens et al. 2007) may function 
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as mediating mechanisms between conflict and performance outcomes. But does the nature and 
strength of the conflict–innovation relationship vary across different intra-organizational 
settings? Despite recent empirical work that highlights contingent factors, such as the way in 
which exchange partners express their opinions about task-related issues (Lovelace et al. 2001) 
or organizational culture (Guerra et al. 2005), a clear need exists for more context-bound 
approaches (Jehn and Bendersky 2003; Rispens et al. 2007; Song et al. 2006; Van de Vliert et al. 
1999).  
We seek to deepen understanding of how contextual factors moderate—amplify or 
suppress—the relationship between conflict and innovation. Specifically, we discuss the nature 
and role of social capital—a key relational resource embedded in exchange relationships 
(Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998)—to suggest that its underlying dimensions of social interaction 
and trust may provide more fine-grained insights into the mechanisms that relate conflict to 
innovation. In the context of the collaboration between functional departments, social interaction 
reflects the strength of the social relationships between exchange partners (Tsai and Ghoshal 
1998); trust reflects the belief that a partner will act benevolently even when the possibility for 
opportunism exists (Zaheer et al. 1998). Although these two dimensions of social capital often go 
hand in hand (Tsai and Ghoshal 1998), they differ from one another: Trusted partners may still 
prefer to maintain formal interactions (Williamson 1993), and informal ties do not prevent 
exchange partners from acting in opportunistic ways (Granovetter 1985). Accordingly, we 
emphasize the distinct aspects of these two dimensions and argue that they interact with conflict 
in opposite ways: Whereas social interaction amplifies the beneficial effect of task conflict and 
the harmful effect of relationship conflict, trust suppresses these effects (Jehn and Bendersky 
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2003). We test these predictions using data about cross-functional interactions in 232 Canadian 
firms. 
We aim to make two main contributions to marketing and innovation literature and 
thereby enrich understanding of the contingencies that underlie the conflict–innovation 
relationship. First, we move beyond the role of cross-functional integration for innovation (Kahn 
1996; Song and Parry 1993) to provide a more detailed understanding of how the resources 
embedded in cross-functional relationships might affect the consequences of disagreements 
across functional departments. The joint consideration of cross-functional conflict and social 
capital offers novel ways to understand how firms can increase their level of innovation based on 
the quality of knowledge exchange that takes place among functional departments. Second, our 
arguments and findings add important nuances to the acclaimed universal beneficial role of 
social capital in intra-organizational functioning (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998; Tsai and Ghoshal 
1998), and the interactions between marketing and R&D in particular. We highlight how some 
challenges associated with cross-functional relationship building can interfere with the 
productive channeling of conflict into innovation.  
CONCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENT 
Nature of Cross-Functional Conflict 
Extant research on innovation highlights the challenges associated with dealing with 
different viewpoints across functional departments. Griffin and Hauser (1996) point to the 
existence of different “thoughtworlds” as one of the reasons for divergent viewpoints between 
marketing and R&D managers and explain that these thoughtworlds may emerge from different 
educational training or professional backgrounds. In such a context, cross-functional cooperation 
can lead to conflicts in which managers from different functional areas disagree about 
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innovation-related decisions (De Luca and Atuahene-Gima 2007; Li and Calantone 1998). For 
example, cross-functional conflict might occur between marketing and R&D functions because 
their focus of attention differs (Lawrence and Lorsch 1967): Marketing managers focus on 
satisfying customer needs and providing protection against competitive threats, whereas R&D 
managers concentrate on issues related to advancing technology, technical feasibility, and 
product functionality (Song and Parry 1993). Moreover, the desire of the marketing function to 
maximize market share may run counter to the focus on technical sophistication and leadership 
set forth by R&D, and such disagreements can provide seeds of conflict between departments 
(Griffin and Hauser 1996; Ruekert and Walker 1987). 
Conflict is multidimensional in nature, and a common distinction marks task conflict, 
(also labeled as functional, cognitive, or constructive conflict) versus relationship conflict (or 
dysfunctional, affective, or destructive conflict) (Amason 1996; Finkelstein and Mooney 2003). 
Task conflict is content-driven and arises because of differences in viewpoints about particular 
tasks. In contrast, relationship conflict is person-driven and arises when there are 
incompatibilities between different personalities, prompting negative feelings such as tension 
and frustration (Amason and Sapienza 1997; Jehn and Mannix 2001). Although early research 
suggests that conflict inhibits effective organizational functioning (e.g., Pondy 1967), more 
recent studies emphasize that the different conflict types relate differently to innovation (Amason 
1996; Jehn 1995). Task conflict plays a beneficial role in innovation, in that disagreements about 
content-related issues are “an antidote to core rigidities because it forces the constant re-
examination of whatever perspective dominates at the time in the organization” (Leonard-Barton 
1995: p. 89). In contrast, relationship conflict suppresses innovation because the associated 
negative emotions have a dysfunctional effect on the quality of knowledge exchange and 
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decision making (Amason 1996; Jehn 1995; Jehn and Mannix 2001; Pelled et al. 1999). For 
example, in a study of 12 technology-based companies, Eisenhardt et al. (1997) explain how 
management teams can have healthy and productive “fights” by focusing on facts and issues 
rather than on personalities and interpersonal dislikes. Such fights lead to broader consideration 
of contrasting information domains, deeper understanding of the situations, and richer sets of 
possible opportunities. Without “good” fights, companies can become restricted to less 
innovative working environments, resulting in lower performance (Eisenhardt et al. 1997).    
Beyond the general notion that different types of conflict play distinct roles in innovation, 
there is limited understanding of how these relationships may be moderated by the organizational 
context in which conflict takes place (Jehn and Bendersky 2003), leading to calls for context-
bound approaches to conflict research (Jehn and Mannix 2001; Song et al. 2006; Van de Vliert et 
al. 1999). Accordingly, we approach our research from a contingency perspective and assess the 
conflict–innovation relationship in light of situational realities. In particular, because conflict 
influences innovation by shaping the flow of knowledge between exchange partners (Amason 
1996; Amason and Sapienza 1997) and social capital plays an important role in the effectiveness 
of such knowledge flows (Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998), we posit that the social capital inherent 
to the relationship between functional departments may influence the conflict–innovation 
relationship.  
Nature of Cross-Functional Social Capital 
The central proposition in social capital literature posits that the nature of the relationship 
between exchange partners constitutes, or leads to, resources that may benefit these partners 
(Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998). Social capital thus represents a relational resource that resides in 
interactions between actors (Coleman 1988). Originally used as an aggregate concept to explain 
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why some communities are able to resolve collective problems cooperatively while others are 
not (Putnam 1993), social capital appears more recently in management and organization 
research as a significant factor for the internal functioning of organizations (Leana and Van 
Buren 1999; Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998; Tsai 2000; Tsai and Ghoshal 1998). Specifically, 
social capital creates a context conducive to the creation of new ideas and knowledge (Nahapiet 
and Ghoshal 1998). 
Consistent with the distinction between structural and relational embeddedness in 
sociology (Granovetter 1985), social capital scholars distinguish between structural and 
relational aspects of social capital (e.g., Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998; Walker et al. 1997). The 
structural dimension reflects the overall pattern of connections between exchange partners, such 
as network configurations and the extent to which network ties are formal or informal. An 
important aspect of this dimension is the level of social interaction, which reflects the strength of 
the social relationships between exchange partners (Tsai and Ghoshal 1998). It captures the 
informal or affective nature of the exchanges between functional departments and thus aligns 
with the concept of cross-functional collaboration in prior literature on innovation and product 
development (Kahn 1996). The relational dimension refers to assets rooted within social 
relationships and reflects the inherent quality of individual ties that constitute the broader 
network of relationships (Coleman 1988), with a specific focus on the role of goodwill trust, 
which creates obligations and expectations about the extent and nature of cooperation (Uzzi 
1997). In marketing literature, this view is represented in examinations of the nature of the 
exchanges that take place between organizations (e.g., Ganesan 1994; Moorman et al. 1992; 
Morgan and Hunt 1994), individual persons (Bstieler 2006; Dwyer et al. 1987; Moorman et al. 
1992), or a hybrid of the two (Bart et al. 2005). 
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Drawing from this literature, we highlight two specific aspects of social capital to explain 
how the intra-organizational social context—as represented by the dimensions of social 
interaction and trust between functional departments—may influence how strongly the conflict 
between marketing and R&D functions promotes or impedes innovation. The glue that holds 
these two dimensions together is their ability to substitute for the more formal, restrictive 
governance of cross-functional exchange (Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998; Yli-Renko et al. 2001). 
Our conceptual model, presented in Figure 1, outlines the moderating effects that the two aspects 
of social capital exert on the relationships between the two types of conflict (cross-functional 
task and relationship) and innovation. In the next section, we outline the rationale underlying 
these interactions, starting with the basic premise that task conflict promotes innovation, whereas 
relationship conflict impedes it.  
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 
HYPOTHESES 
Moderating Effects of Cross-Functional Social Interaction 
Cross-functional task conflict. We expect that the positive relationship between cross-
functional task conflict and innovation grows particularly strong when strong social ties exist 
between functional departments. Strong ties facilitate joint problem-solving efforts and thus the 
ability of functional departments to learn from discussions about content-related issues (Larson 
1992). Uzzi (1997) finds that a critical aspect of “embedded” ties is the improved ability to solve 
problems jointly, which enables decision makers to work through problems, get direct feedback, 
increase learning, search deeply for solutions, and reach integrative solutions. Similarly, Heide 
and Miner (1992) indicate that when exchange partners disagree, close social interactions 
enhance their mutual adjustment and efforts to engage in shared problem solving. Consequently, 
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when informal communication channels are in place, content-related disagreements stimulate 
functional managers to recognize their different interpretations as well as the need to incorporate 
these differences into the products that their organization develops, because the message 
associated with social interactions is the desire to find mutually beneficial solutions to whatever 
content-related problems might arise (De Dreu et al. 2000). Also, social ties can facilitate the 
development of a common identity among functional managers and thereby settle disagreements 
among different points of view more effectively (Uzzi 1997). These arguments suggest that to 
the extent that marketing and R&D functions engage in close social interactions, the organization 
should exhibit a greater ability to harness different opinions into initiatives for new product 
development or new market entry, leading to our first hypothesis: 
H1: The positive relationship between cross-functional task conflict and innovation is 
moderated by the level of cross-functional social interaction, such that this positive 
relationship is stronger (i.e., steeper) for higher levels of cross-functional social 
interaction.  
Cross-functional relationship conflict. Cross-functional social interaction can amplify not 
only the advantages of task conflict but also the downsides of relationship conflict. Prior research 
points out that relationship conflict prompts negative feelings, such as anxiety, resentment, or 
frustration (Jehn 1995). To the extent that functional managers have close interactions, the 
negative feelings associated with relationship conflict can be reinforced within the organization. 
Specifically, when functional managers exhibit personal animosity toward colleagues in other 
departments during conflict situations, such negative emotions can be triggered more easily 
when interactions are more intensive (Rispens et al. 2007). This argument is in line with prior 
research attesting to the danger of close interactions, which might lock parties into a negative 
conflict spiral (De Dreu and Van Vianen 2001). Furthermore, relationship conflict is difficult to 
settle to the mutual satisfaction of the involved parties when it requires addressing issues 
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fundamental to their personal identity (Druckman 1994). Consequently, though social interaction 
might help clarify disputes between functional managers and alter their understanding of the 
conflict situation, such interactions pose the danger of escalating the emotional underpinnings of 
the conflict and hindering effective collaboration within the organization because more 
connected exchange partners tend to have more intense perceptions of their conflict (Rispens et 
al. 2007). Therefore, rather than resolving relationship conflict, social interaction can make it 
loom bigger and seem intractable (Harinck et al. 2000). To the extent that marketing and R&D 
functions connect through strong social ties then, any negative relationship energy between them 
may further decrease the quality of cross-functional knowledge exchange and impede innovation. 
H2: The negative relationship between cross-functional relationship conflict and 
innovation is moderated by the level of cross-functional social interaction, such that this 
negative relationship is stronger (steeper) for higher levels of cross-functional social 
interaction.  
 
Moderating Effects of Cross-Functional Trust 
Cross-functional task conflict. The benefits of cross-functional task conflict for 
innovation can be suppressed when marketing and R&D managers maintain high levels of trust. 
Although trust can facilitate knowledge flow directly (Yli-Renko et al. 2001) or reduce conflict 
(Porter and Lilley 1996), its indirect effect on innovation is more complex. Langfred (2004) finds 
that trust limits exchange partners’ critical stances toward the other’s different viewpoints and 
behavior: Trust reduces the extent to which exchange partners monitor each other’s behavior and 
thus their propensity to question or intervene in others' daily tasks and work. Consequently, high 
levels of trust can suppress the very behaviors that make task conflict beneficial for innovation. 
Such a negative interaction between task conflict and trust is consistent with the association of 
trust with “groupthink” or “too much” social cohesion (Janis 1982; Sethi et al. 2001). 
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Collaborative settings characterized by high levels of trust can exert a powerful influence to 
conform (Baron et al. 1996), so such settings are susceptible to decision biases due to the 
suppression of conflicting opinions and constructive discussion (Janis 1982). At high levels of 
trust, the inclusion of conflicting opinions in decision making could be perceived as a violation 
of the trust itself (Lewicki and Bunker 1996). Thus, the need to be perceived as a trustworthy 
“team player” and the associated desire to conform and not hurt the feelings of trusted colleagues 
can negatively impact the extent to which organizations productively exploit conflict about 
content-related issues in their decision-making processes (Ayers et al. 1997). In short, at higher 
levels of trust, the reluctance to energize cross-functional exchanges, subject to task conflict, 
may mitigate their potential contribution to innovation. 
H3: The positive relationship between cross-functional task conflict and innovation is 
moderated by the level of cross-functional trust, such that this positive relationship is 
weaker (i.e., less steep) for higher levels of cross-functional trust. 
 
Cross-functional relationship conflict. Finally, trust can suppress the harmful effect of 
relationship conflict on innovation. The uncertainty and uneasiness resulting from negative 
emotions in personal conflicts among functional managers should decrease when the conflicting 
parties believe that others will not behave opportunistically in conflict situations. In this respect, 
extant research emphasizes benevolence as an important aspect of trust that reflects partners’ 
willingness to show consideration for and sensitivity to the needs and interests of others, as well 
as refrain from exploiting the other party’s feelings for the benefit of their own interests (Mayer 
et al. 1995). Similarly, because trust facilitates affective attachments and feelings of connection 
(Yli-Renko et al. 2001), it is less likely that trusting functional managers will compromise the 
quality of their knowledge exchange due to personal animosity. This argument also mirrors the 
notion that trust implies a “leap of faith” (Wicks et al. 1999) that acts as a moral control 
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mechanism to minimize the potential negative effects stemming from tensions and other negative 
emotions (Ghoshal and Moran 1996; Granovetter 1985). In contrast, in collaborative settings 
characterized by low levels of trust, functional managers are more likely to interpret situations of 
personal conflict as intentionally harmful and vicious and therefore might refrain from 
productive knowledge exchange. Prior research attests that perceptions of distrust lead to a 
negative spiral in which distrust is reciprocated and further accentuates the negative feelings 
associated with personal quarrels (Creed and Miles 1996). These arguments suggest that to the 
extent that marketing and R&D managers trust each other, the negative consequences of 
relationship conflict for innovation can be suppressed. 
H4: The negative relationship between cross-functional relationship conflict and 
innovation is moderated by the level of cross-functional trust, such that this negative 
relationship is weaker (i.e., less steep) for higher levels of cross-functional trust. 
 
RESEARCH METHODS 
Sample and Data Collection 
To ensure the wide applicability of our findings, we test our hypotheses with a sample of 
firms active in a variety of industrial sectors. We obtained, from a private market research 
company, a list of 1,500 randomly selected Canadian firms, representative of the country’s 
provinces and industrial sectors. Similar to approaches used in prior research (e.g., Simons and 
Peterson 2000; Song et al. 2006), we used a single-respondent design and obtained contact 
information about managers active in either a marketing- or R&D-related function. We then sent 
a survey instrument to one randomly selected functional manager per firm. To pretest the survey 
and ensure that our questions were clear and understandable, we undertook informal interviews 
with six randomly chosen functional managers (three marketing, three R&D) who were not 
included in the initial sample and with whom we discussed the survey instrument as well as the 
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challenges associated with cross-functional cooperation in their respective firms. Their input 
helped us improve the readability and relevance of our survey instrument. 
Our data collection relies on Dillman’s (1978) total design method. We prepared a 
mailing packet containing (1) a cover letter addressed personally to the functional managers of 
the sampled firms, (2) a questionnaire, and (3) a postage-paid return envelope. Two weeks after 
the initial electronic mailing, we conducted “thank you” calls to those who had responded and 
reminder calls to those who had not. Four weeks after the initial mailing, we sent replacement 
questionnaires to nonrespondents. Some initially selected firms were unfit for the final sample 
because they were not active any more, had moved and their new address could not be identified, 
or no longer employed the selected respondents. We ended up with 950 potential respondents 
and received 232 completed surveys, for a response rate of 24%, which is approximately 
consistent with other studies pertaining to innovation and social exchange (Aiken and Bousch 
2006; Schatzel and Calantone 2005). The responding firms operate in a wide variety of sectors, 
including manufacturing (standard industrial classification [SIC] 20–39), nonfinancial services 
(SIC 70–89), mining (SIC 10–14), construction (SIC 15–17), transportation (SIC 40–49), 
wholesale (SIC 50–51), retail (SIC 52–59), and finance (SIC 60–67). No substantial differences 
mark respondents and non-respondents or early and late respondents (Armstrong and Overton 
1977).  
Following prior research (Yli-Renko et al. 2001), we tested the validity of the study’s key 
constructs by administering a follow-up survey six-months after the initial one. In the follow-up 
survey, we used a shortened format of the original questionnaire; for each construct, we chose 
one proxy item from the original survey that we believed best represented the overall construct. 
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We received 78 responses to the follow-up survey and found that all validation items had 
positive correlations with the original measures.  
Measures of Constructs 
In Table 1, we list the measures used in our analysis, detailing their individual items, 
overall reliability estimates (Cronbach’s alpha, composite reliability), average variance extracted 
(AVE), and correlations with their single-item counterparts from the follow-up survey. In line 
with our research focus, our measures assess respondents’ perceptions about the relationship 
between the marketing and R&D functions in their organizations.  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
Innovation. Following prior research (Jansen et al. 2006; Uzzi and Lancaster 2003), we 
measure innovation using seven items that reflect the extent to which the firm develops new 
products and services or pursues innovations for customers or markets (e.g., experimenting with 
new products or services in the local market, using new distribution channels). As a confirmation 
of this measure’s predictive validity, we find that it correlates positively with income growth 
over the last year (r = .256, p < .05), according to data we gather from a secondary source about 
a subset (n = 70) of the firms in our sample. 
Cross-functional task conflict. We measure cross-functional task conflict with a four-item 
scale based on prior literature on group and interdepartmental conflict (Dyer and Song 1998; 
Jehn and Mannix 2001). For example, respondents indicated the extent to which different 
functions have conflicting opinions about projects or disagreements about task-related issues.  
Cross-functional relationship conflict. Following Dyer and Song (1998) and Jehn and 
Mannix (2001), we measure relationship conflict with a four-item scale that assesses whether 
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interactions between different functions are characterized by person-related issues (e.g., people 
in different functions get angry with one another or do not get along well).   
Cross-functional social interaction. Following prior studies (Tsai and Ghoshal 1998; Yli-
Renko et al. 2001), we measure social interaction with four items that reflect the strength of 
social relationships between functional departments. For example, we asked the respondents to 
rate the extent to which people in different functions know one another on a personal level or 
maintain close social relationships.  
Cross-functional trust. Drawing from literature on interpersonal trust (Rempel et al. 
1985) and interfirm trust (Morgan and Hunt 1994), we measure the overall level of trust between 
marketing and R&D managers using a five-item scale. Respondents indicated, for example, 
whether people from other functions keep their promises and avoid taking advantage of them, 
even if the opportunity arises.  
Control variables. We include several control variables to avoid model misspecification 
and take into account possible alternative explanations for variations in innovation. First, we 
control for firm size, which we measure as a log transformation of the number of full-time 
employees. Second, we control for firm age, measured as the number of years the firm has been 
in business. Third, to account for the possible variation across industries in terms of their 
maturity and associated innovation propensity, we control for the industry of the firm. Fourth, we 
control for whether the respondent represents the marketing or R&D function. To determine 
whether the results might be influenced by the functional background of the respondents, as a 
post-hoc test, we also run two separate sets of regressions for the marketing- and R&D-related 
functions. The results are consistent with the reported regression results. 
Assessing the Reliability and Validity of Measures 
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In line with Anderson and Gerbing (1988), we estimate a five-factor measurement model 
using AMOS 6.0. Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) reveals factor loadings greater than .40, 
normalized residuals less than 2.58, and modification indices less than 3.84 (Anderson and 
Gerbing 1988). These results suggest that no deletions of scale items are needed to improve 
model fit. We also note that the measurement model fits the data well: 2(242) = 466.71, 
goodness-of-fit index (GFI) = .90, Tucker-Lewis index (TLI) = .94, confirmatory fit index (CFI) 
= .95, and root mean squared error of approximation (RMSEA) = .06. 
We affirm the convergent validity of our scales with the significant factor loadings in the 
measurement model (t > 2.0; Gerbing and Anderson 1988) and the magnitude of our AVE 
estimates (equal to or greater than .50, Bagozzi and Yi 1988). Several assessment criteria also 
support the discriminant validity of our constructs. None of the confidence intervals for the 
correlations between constructs includes 1.0 (p < .05) (Anderson and Gerbing 1988), and the 
AVE estimates of the constructs are greater than the squared correlations between the 
corresponding pairs of constructs (Fornell and Larcker 1981). In addition, we find significant 
differences between the unconstrained model and a constrained model (Anderson and Gerbing 
1988) for all 10 pairs of constructs, such as between task and relationship conflict (2(1) > 40.14, 
p < .001) and between social interaction and trust (2(1) > 56.58, p < .001).  
We conduct several diagnostic analyses to rule out the possibility of common method 
bias in our results. First, we conduct a CFA for a single-factor model and find poor fit with the 
data (2(252) = 1802.38, GFI = .52, TLI = .46, CFI = .51, RMSEA = .16), significantly worse 
(Δ2(10) = 1335.67, p < .001) than the fit of the five-factor model. Second, we compare a post-hoc 
“hypothesized” model that includes the four interactions terms—as we discuss in the 
“Supplementary Analysis” section—with a model that contains an added common method factor 
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(Podsakoff et al. 2003; Song et al., 2006). This analysis reveals very small differences in the fit 
indices between the hypothesized model (χ2(112) = 198.96; GFI = .92, TLI = .92, CFI = .95, 
RMSEA = .06) and the model that includes the common method factor (χ2(111) = 198.17; GFI = 
.92, TLI = .92, CFI = .95, RMSEA = .06); moreover, the chi-square difference between the two 
models is not significant (Δ2(1) = .79; ns). In addition, we observe only small changes in the size 
and significance of the paths across the two models. These results, together with arguments that 
common method bias is less prevalent in studies using highly educated respondents and multi-
item scales (Bergkvist and Rossiter 2007) and for moderating effects rather than main effects 
(Brockner et al. 1997; see also Simons and Peterson 2000), alleviate possible concerns related to 
the use of a common respondent in our study.   
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
We provide the correlations and descriptive statistics for the study variables in Table 2. 
We use moderated hierarchical regression analysis to test our hypotheses, mean-centering our 
interacting variables to minimize multicollinearity (Aiken and West 1991). All variance inflation 
factor values are less than three, suggesting that multicollinearity is not an issue. 
In Table 3, we provide the regression results. Model 1 contains only the control variables; 
Model 2 adds the direct effects of task conflict, relationship conflict, social interaction, and trust; 
and Model 3 adds the two-way interaction terms. Both Models 2 and 3 reveal a significant 
improvement in model fit (∆R2 = .11 and .04, respectively, p < .05), attesting to the importance 
of the variables representing our hypotheses. In Model 2, consistent with the basic premise of our 
theoretical discussion, task and relationship conflict have, respectively, positive and negative 
effects on organizational innovation. In addition, we find a positive, direct effect of social 
interaction on innovation but no significant relationship between trust and innovation.  
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The results in Model 3 suggest a positive interaction effect between social interaction and 
task conflict (β = .27, p < .05). Figure 2 plots this interaction, indicating the effect of task conflict 
on innovation at high and low levels of social interaction (Aiken and West 1991). This 
relationship is stronger when social interaction is high than when it is low, in support of 
Hypothesis 1. 
In Hypothesis 2, we predict a negative interaction between relationship conflict and 
social interaction in affecting innovation. The interaction term is negative and significant (β = -
.26, p < .05), and the corresponding interaction plot in Figure 3 indicates that the negative 
relationship between relationship conflict and innovation becomes amplified when there are 
strong social ties between functional departments. This result supports Hypothesis 2.  
The results for the moderating effect of cross-functional trust are mixed. Its interaction 
effect with task conflict is negative and significant (β = -.32, p < .01), whereas its interaction 
effect with relationship conflict is positive but not significant (thus, we find no support for 
Hypothesis 4). The plot of the interaction between trust and task conflict, as shown in Figure 4, 
indicates no relationship between task conflict and innovation at high levels of cross-functional 
trust and a positive relationship at low levels of trust. This interaction pattern suggests a 
suppressing effect of trust on the task conflict–innovation relationship, in support of Hypothesis 
3. 
[Insert Table 3 and Figures 2-4 about here] 
 
To shed further light on the presence and significance of a relationship between the 
different conflict types and innovation at varying levels of social interaction and trust, we 
conduct simple slope analyses for each plot (Aiken and West 1991). We find that (1) there is a 
positive relationship (t = 3.54; p < .001) between task conflict and innovation at high levels of 
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social interaction but no such relationship (t = .27; ns) at low levels of social interaction, (2) 
there is a negative relationship (t = -3.77; p < .001) between relationship conflict and innovation 
at high levels of social interaction but no such relationship (t = -.64; ns) at low levels of social 
interaction, and (3) there is a positive relationship between task conflict and innovation at low 
levels of trust (t = 3.72; p < .001) but no such relationship (t =- .06; ns) at high levels of trust. 
Overall, these results corroborate our support for Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3. 
Finally, to test the robustness of our results, we run a supplementary analysis in which we 
use the innovation measure from the follow-up survey as the dependent variable. Because of the 
limited statistical power (n = 78), which is particularly needed for interaction effects (Greene 
2004), some of the significant moderating effects become weaker or disappear; however, the 
signs of the moderating effects are similar to those based on the single-round data, which 
corroborates the validity of our results 
Supplementary Analysis 
 To validate our results and rule out alternative model specifications, we conduct several 
additional analyses. First, considering prior evidence of direct relationships between conflict and 
trust (Langfred 2007; Porter and Lilly 1996; Rispens et al. 2007), task conflict and relationship 
conflict (Peterson and Behfar 2003; Simons and Peterson 2000), and social interaction and trust 
(Ferrin et al. 2006; Tsai and Ghoshal 1998), we estimate a “hypothesized” structural equation 
model (SEM) with specified covariances among all pairs of the four interacting variables, 
thereby accounting for their mutual dependence. This model offers an appropriate fit (χ2(112) = 
198.96, GFI = .92, TLI = .92, CFI = .95, RMSEA = .06), and the sign, magnitude, and 
significance of the moderating effects are consistent with those from the regression analysis, as 
illustrated in Model 4 in Table 3. 
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 Second, to test for the possibility that the four focal constructs constitute sub-dimensions 
of one superordinate construct, we compare the fit of a main effects model (χ2(314) = 636.13, GFI 
= .83, TLI = .90, CFI = .90, RMSEA = .06) with the fit of a model in which a second-order 
factor mediates the relationship between the four constructs and innovation (χ2(319) = 736.83, GFI 
= .79, TLI = .84, CFI = .85, RMSEA = .08). The former model exhibits a significantly better fit, 
(Δχ2(5) = 100.70; p < .01), suggesting that the four constructs are conceptually distinct.  
Third, we run two alternative SEM models: one with social interaction and trust as 
mediating variables (Model A) and another with task conflict and relationship conflict as 
mediating variables (Model B). The fit indices of these two mediating models (Model A: χ2(114) = 
210.11, GFI = .91, TLI = .91, CFI = .94, RMSEA = .06; Model B: χ2(114) = 207.50, GFI = .92, 
TLI = .92, CFI = .94, RMSEA = .06) are similar to those of the hypothesized moderating model, 
which shows that our suggested contingency approach offers an alternative, equally potent 
perspective. 
DISCUSSION 
A firm’s ability to exhibit high levels of innovation depends on productive exchanges 
between its marketing and R&D departments (Li and Calantone 1998). In the process of 
innovation, conflict inevitably arises in such cross-functional interactions because people with 
different personal interests and professional backgrounds come together in their pursuit of 
accomplishing the organization’s innovative goals (Griffin and Hauser 1996). This study 
captures the interplay between conflict and relationship building by examining the role that 
cross-functional social capital (i.e., social interaction and trust) plays in channeling conflict into 
innovative output. We expand the understanding of the social contingencies underlying the 
conflict–innovation relationship (De Dreu and Weingart 2003; Jehn and Bendersky 2003), and 
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by highlighting the opposing roles of social interaction and trust in their interaction with conflict, 
we add important nuances to our understanding of the role of social capital for intra-
organizational functioning.  
First, as expected, the beneficial aspects of task conflict are more pronounced when 
stronger social ties exist between functional departments (Figure 2). That is, for high levels of 
cross-functional interpersonal interactions, marketing and R&D functions are more effective in 
coping with and leveraging disagreements about content-related issues. Social interactions lower 
the cooperative barriers between departments and thus facilitate joint problem-solving across 
functional departments (Atuahene-Gima and Murray 2007; Uzzi 1997), which in turns enables 
the productive resolution of task conflict into innovative solutions. In contrast, at low levels of 
social interaction, task conflict does not appear to increase innovation. 
Second, cross-functional social interaction has a negative moderating effect on the link 
between relationship conflict and innovation (Figure 3). Although prior research points to the 
beneficial role of social interaction for stimulating high-quality knowledge exchange (Nahapiet 
and Ghoshal 1998; Yli-Renko et al. 2001), it might have overlooked the importance of the 
emotional context in which these interactions take place (Rispens et al. 2007). Our study shows 
that social interaction is harmful rather than beneficial in collaborative contexts characterized by 
high levels of personal animosity and personality clashes. Specifically, whereas at low levels of 
social interaction, no relationship exists between relationship conflict and innovation, the 
presence of strong ties between functional departments appears to amplify the negative feelings 
associated with relationship conflict and thus indicates a strong negative relationship between 
relationship conflict and innovation. As such, our study is perhaps the first to show that if 
functional managers are prone to personal disagreements with colleagues from other 
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departments, the negative emotions associated with such conflicts become amplified and more 
easily invoked by close social interactions and, in turn, impede the organization’s innovation 
processes. Our study thus clarifies an important boundary condition for the perceived beneficial 
effect of strong relationships for organizational innovation (De Luca and Atuahene-Gima 2007; 
Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998): Social interactions can be destructive to the extent that they 
activate negative emotions or personal tensions that exist between marketing and R&D 
functional managers. We further speculate that, outside the cross-functional context, this result 
may be even more pronounced within new product development teams whose members are 
physically proximate to one another and intensively work together on a particular project for a 
given period of time (Lovelace et al., 2001).   
Third, our results confirm a negative interaction effect between cross-functional task 
conflict and trust. The positive relationship between task conflict and innovation occurs only 
with low trust; with high trust, a positive relationship is absent (Figure 4). This finding provides 
an important nuance to the acclaimed positive effect of trust for generating positive outcomes in 
exchange relationships both between and within organizations (Anderson and Narus 1990; 
Bstieler 2006; Uzzi 1997), in that trust prevents, rather than encourages, the benefits of task-
related disagreements in fostering innovation. Extant research accords strong benefits to the 
presence of trust in exchange relationships, in that a belief in others’ goodwill frees up resources 
for productive knowledge exchange (Bstieler 2006; Zaheer et al. 1998) and decreases the 
likelihood that task conflict turns into relationship conflict (Peterson and Behfar 2003; Simons 
and Peterson 2000). Yet our arguments and results point to the harmful effect of trust in 
preventing the full exploitation of conflicting viewpoints about task-related issues as a means to 
realize innovation (Sethi et al. 2001). As such, this study extends prior arguments that high levels 
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of trust might limit productive discussions because less learning takes place (Yli-Renko et al. 
2001) and that the reduced level of monitoring associated with trust can be destructive rather 
than constructive (Langfred 2004). Furthermore, high levels of trust may diminish the productive 
exchange of critical viewpoints, to avoid breaching trust that has developed; that is, a propensity 
to attempt not to hurt the feelings of trusted exchange parties might restrain functional managers 
from freely expressing their conflicting opinions (Ayers et al. 1997).   
Fourth, we do not find support for our proposition that cross-functional trust suppresses 
the link between relationship conflict and innovation. This lack of finding may be due to the 
respondents’ “automatic” association of relationship conflict with low levels of trust (r = -.61, 
Table 2). Future research should seek to disentangle the interplay between relationship conflict 
and trust further in innovative settings.  
In summary, these findings extend current marketing literature in several ways. First, we 
provide a more elaborate understanding of the relationship between cross-functional conflict and 
innovation by outlining important contingency factors that underlie the relationship and thus 
provide empirical evidence of conceptual arguments that the performance outcomes of conflict 
depend on the situational context of the conflict (De Dreu and Weingart 2003; Jehn and 
Bendersky 2003). Although current literature distinguishes between disagreements about 
content- versus person-related issues, it often focuses on the antecedents of these conflict types 
(e.g., Matsuo 2006; Porter and Lilly 1996) or how different processes may function as mediating 
mechanisms between conflict and performance (De Dreu 2006; Langfred 2007; Rispens et al. 
2007; Song et al. 2006). In doing so, it ignores how the nature of the conflict–innovation 
relationship might fare differently across the different social contexts in which conflict takes 
place at a given point in time (Jehn and Bendersky 2003). Our study addresses this gap. Second, 
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the focus on cross-functional social capital aligns with marketing literature that considers the 
importance of cross-functional relationship building for generating innovation (e.g., De Luca and 
Atuahene-Gima 2007; Griffin and Hauser 1996; Kahn 1996; Li and Calantone 1998; Luo et al. 
2006). Yet virtually no attention has been devoted to how cross-functional relationship building 
interferes with the conflict–innovation relationship. Our results with respect to the opposing 
moderating effects of social interaction and trust provides added nuance to the perceived 
beneficial effect of social capital (Tsai and Ghoshal 1998). Prior evidence of the benefits of 
social capital might not have provided a complete picture of certain costs associated with social 
capital or ignored the possibility that these costs might outweigh the benefits in the interplay 
with conflict in cross-functional settings. 
Managerial Implications 
This study’s results have several important managerial implications. First, though not the 
primary focus of this study, the direct effects of task conflict and relationship conflict on 
innovation (positive and negative, respectively) support the view shared by marketing and 
product innovation scholars (e.g., Dyer and Song 1998; Eisenhardt, Kahwajy, and Bourgeois 
1997; Ruekert and Walker 1987) that healthy cross-functional collaboration implies neither 
absolute harmony nor battles about personal issues but rather a “friendly rivalry” among people 
from different departments that helps create and nurture an environment that lends itself to 
innovation. A notable example of how strong emotional disagreements may arise from initial 
disagreement about content-related issues is Delta Airlines in the mid-1990s, when discussions 
about how the company could be saved from a mounting sea of red ink turned into strong intra-
organizational, person-related battles that ultimately led to the firing of the company’s CEO 
(Baron and Shane 2005). An important challenge for organizations is to develop strategies that 
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prevent task conflict from turning into relationship conflict, such as by uncovering the true 
content-related causes that underlie task disagreements, avoiding tactics that reflect a win–lose 
approach, and broadening the scope of the issues considered during task-related discussions 
(Amason, 1996; Peterson and Behfar, 2003; Simons and Peterson, 2000; Song et al., 2006). 
Second, whereas cross-functional social interaction increases the benefits of task conflict, 
these benefits may backfire if cross-functional disagreements entail negative feelings such as 
anxiety, frustration, or even personality battles (Jehn et al. 1999). Companies seeking to 
stimulate cross-functional social interaction by having marketing and R&D employees work in 
close proximity or rotate through different functions (Griffin and Hauser 1997) would be well 
advised to consider the possible drawbacks associated with such social interactions. Accordingly, 
the “close-quarter” workplace design developed to promote social interactions between 
employees of different functional areas should be used with great caution in the presence of 
interpersonal dislike. Such workplace arrangements appear at many organizations, such as the 
Danish hearing-aid company Oticon, which decided to widen its staircases to encourage 
multifunctional interchanges after learning that most social interactions at its workplaces 
occurred on stairwells (Kelley and Littman 2001). Our warning, however, remains: If personal 
misunderstandings and arguments across departments remain unresolved, social interactions can 
hamper the organization’s potential to exhibit high levels of innovation. Accordingly, top 
managers should be attuned to the personal animosities that may exist across departments and 
promote social interactions that circumvent any suppressing effect on high-quality knowledge 
exchange.  
Third, the negative interaction between cross-functional task conflict and trust indicates 
that blind confidence in others’ goodwill may overpower the effective exploitation of alternative 
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ideas and viewpoints and thus hamper innovation (Ayers et al. 1997). At the extreme, high levels 
of trust could turn functional members into “rubber stampers” who blindly endorse and approve 
solutions provided by trusted peers, without engaging in careful thought about which solutions 
are most instrumental for developing new products or entering new markets. Hence, 
organizations must remain alert for and prevent symptoms of groupthink in cross-functional 
exchanges, as illustrated by poor information search, incomplete reviews of alternatives, or 
selective perceptions of information and alternatives (Janis 1982). Instead, they should promote 
the open, critical, and constructive consideration of wide ranges of opinions to avoid situations in 
which potential problems or breakthrough solutions get swept under the rug to protect the trust 
and goodwill of colleagues. Top management should encourage a culture and communication 
channels through which functional managers can voice and receive dissenting opinions and 
consider how these opinions may be highlighted, integrated, and ultimately applied to innovative 
ends (Horibe 2001). Perhaps what is needed is the “idea-exchanging meeting style” propagated 
by Alfred P. Sloan, which postpones final decisions, even after all parties come to a complete 
agreement, to “give [everyone] time to develop disagreements and perhaps gain some 
understanding of what the decision is all about” (Rabe 2006: p. 39).  
Fourth, because the two dimensions of social capital are closely aligned (Ferrin et al. 
2006; Tsai and Ghoshal 1998), this study indicates that organizations that seek high levels of 
innovation should consider and resolve the challenges of exploiting the benefits of task conflict 
while minimizing the disadvantages of relationship conflict. To this end, implementing 
appropriate conflict-handling mechanisms, such as focusing on collaboration that reduces the 
escalation of negative emotions while promoting the consideration of others’ viewpoints (Song et 
al. 2006), may provide substantial benefits to the organization.  
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Limitations and Future Research Directions 
We acknowledge that our study contains some limitations, which in turn offer 
opportunities for further research. First, for parsimony, we focus on one set of potential 
moderators of cross-functional conflict and innovation. Although our focus on cross-functional 
social capital is guided by the observation that both social capital and conflict shape the quality 
of knowledge flow between organizational functions (Amason 1996; Amason and Sapienza 
1997; Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998), additional research might consider a broader set of 
contingency variables and explore, for example, how the relationship between cross-functional 
conflict and innovation could be colored by the level of cross-functional political activity 
(Eisenhardt and Bourgeois 1988) or the extent to which different functions compete for the same 
resources (Luo et al. 2006). 
Second, the cross-sectional nature of our data demands caution when drawing causal 
inferences, because the relationships may be susceptible to reverse causality. For example, the 
relationship between conflict and innovation might be reversed, such that high innovation levels 
may decrease conflict if such innovation were intended and thus represent positive performance 
feedback (Peterson and Behfar 2003). Furthermore, additional studies could measure conflict and 
social capital at different points in time to examine whether or how their interdependence (e.g., 
Langfred 2007; Porter and Lilly 1996; Rispens et al. 2007) and associated endogeneity alter the 
insights offered by this study.  
Third, similar to Song et al. (2006), we use a single-respondent design, instead of 
establishing two respondents per firm, to alleviate concerns by respondents about the 
confidentiality of their responses. Yet different functional areas may have different perceptions 
about the conflict that arises in their collaboration (Jehn and Chatman, 2000), and therefore, our 
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reliance on data from one party per firm might not paint a complete picture of the nature of the 
relationship between the firms’ functional departments. 
Fourth, the roles of cross-functional conflict and social capital for firm innovation might 
be weaved into more complex configurations that also include the type of innovation (e.g., 
incremental versus radical) or different contextual settings. Looking beyond innovation, research 
could examine whether the mechanisms we suggest apply to other strategic postures. Similarly, 
further research could examine whether the study’s results also apply to settings different from 
the one used in this study. We have no a priori reason to believe that the interaction patterns 
observed herein would be different for collaboration within functional departments or specific 
teams, but the magnitude of the observed effects might be more pronounced in settings in which 
group members interact with one another on an intensive, day-to-day basis, such as in new 
product development teams (Lovelace et al., 2001). 
Finally, we focus on firms’ level of innovation rather than innovation performance as an 
outcome of cross-functional processes. Although firms’ propensity to develop new products or 
enter new markets serves as a possible driver of firm performance (Teece et al. 1997), we have 
attempted to gain a better understanding of the mechanisms that underlie this propensity and thus 
concentrate on the origins of firms’ competitive advantage. This focus on innovation is also 
consistent with other studied outcomes of conflict, such as creativity (Amason 1996; Jehn 1995), 
and enables us to identify the specific mechanisms through which contingency factors operate 
(Jehn and Benkersky 2003). Yet future research should consider how the interplay between the 
cross-functional processes studied herein and an organization’s innovation propensity ultimately 
affects its actual performance. 
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TABLE 1 
Constructs and Measurement Items 
 
 Factor 
Loading 
t-Value 
Innovation (α = 0.85; CR = 0.87; AVE = 0.51)    
Our company accepts demands that go beyond existing products and 
services. 
0.612 9.274 
We focus on inventing new products and services. 0.571 6.445 
We experiment with new products and services in our local market. 0.817 12.83 
We commercialize products and services that are completely new to our 
company. 
0.783 8.183 
We frequently utilize new opportunities in new markets. 0.895 8.649 
Our company regularly uses new distribution channels. 0.664 10.16 
We regularly search for and approach new clients in new markets. 0.606
 a
 - 
Task conflict (α = 0.85; CR = 0.82; AVE = 0.54)   
The two functions often have conflicting opinions about projects. 0.729 13.279 
The two functions often have conflicting ideas. 0.758
 a
 - 
The tasks pursued by the two functions are often incompatible with each 
other. 
0.648 8.658 
The two functions often have disagreements about task-related issues. 0.799 10.535 
Relationship conflict (α = 0.91; CR = 0.90; AVE = 0.70)   
People in the two functions often get angry while working together. 0.783 10.952 
There often are tensions in the relationship between the two functions. 0.758
 a
 - 
People from the two functions do not get along well with one another. 0.922 13.1 
People from the two functions generally dislike interacting with each 
other. 
0.875 12.45 
Social interaction  (α = 0.81; CR = 0.83; AVE = 0.57)   
People in the two functions spend significant time together in social 
situations. 
0.842 13.871 
People in the two functions maintain close social relationships with one 
another. 
0.966
 a
 - 
People in the two functions know members of the other function on a 
personal level. 
0.674 10.325 
Our relationship with people from the other function is very informal. 0.432 5.271 
Trust  (α = 0.87; CR = 0.87; AVE = 0.57)   
People from the other function can always be trusted to do what is right 
for us. 
0.632 9.445 
People from the other function always keep the promises they make to 
us. 
0.728 11.537 
People from the other function are perfectly honest and truthful with us. 0.892
 a
 - 
People from the other function are truly sincere in their promises. 0.844 14.513 
People from the other function would not take advantage of us, even if 
the opportunity arose. 
0.658 9.98 
Notes: 
a
 Initial loading was fixed to 1 to set the scale of the construct. 
CR = construct reliability; AVE = average variance extracted. 
Correlations with the single-item measures in the follow-up survey: 
Innovation  r = .43, p < .001 
      Task conflict  r = .21, p < .05 
      Relationship conflict r = .34, p < .001 
      Social interaction           r = .44, p < .001 
Trust   r = .36, p < .001
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TABLE 2 
Correlation Matrix (n = 232) 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1. Innovation                 
2. Task conflict -.06                
3. Relation. conflict -.24
**
 .73
**
               
4. Social interaction .27
**
 -.17
*
 -.37
**
              
5. Trust .22
**
 -.52
**
 -.61
**
 .35
**
             
6. Company size -.06 -.03 -.06 -.16
*
 .05            
7. Company age -.17
**
 -.05 -.09 -.15
*
 .06 .52
**
           
8. Industry: manufact. .01 -.03 -.07 -.04 .09 .11 .09          
9. Industry: services .04 .00 .04 .00 -.08 -.15 -.13 -.58
**
         
10. Industry: mining -.06 .04 .00 .05 -.06 -.06 -.10 -.31
**
 -.20
**
        
11. Industry: construct .10 -.16
*
 -.12 .03 .12 .04 .05 -.13 -.08 -.04       
12. Industry: transport. -.07 .02 .06 -.02 .01 .10 .01 -.23
**
 -.15
*
 -.08 -.03      
13. Industry: wholesal. .06 -.01 -.01 .08 .06 -.07 -.08 -.19
**
 -.12 -.07 -.03 -.05     
14. Industry: retail .00 .12 .07 -.05 -.05 .08 .35
**
 -.15
*
 -.10 -.05 -.02 -.04 -.03    
15. Industry: finance -.12 .04 .09 -.03 -.10 .04 -.04 -.14
*
 -.09 -.05 -.02 -.04 -.03 -.02   
16. Marketing function -.04 .06 -.01 -.03 .07 .17
*
 .19
**
 .03 -.04 -.08 .07 -.01 .03 .00 .09  
Mean 3.44 2.69 2.06 2.83 3.41 5.59 32.68 .47 .27 .09 .02 .06 .04 .03 .02 .49 
Standard deviation .80 .80 .88 .79 .77 2.03 37.27 .50 .45 .29 .13 .23 .19 .16 .15 .50 
Minimum 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.10 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 
Maximum 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 11.31 337.0 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
**p < .01; *p < .05.
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TABLE 3 
Regression Results (Dependent Variable: Innovation) (n = 232) 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 
Model 4 
c
 
(SEM) 
Company size (log employees) .026 .031 .034 .037 
Company age (years) -.005** -.005** -.005** -.006** 
Industry: manufacturing 
a
 .744* .552 .595 .646
+
 
Industry: services .742* .590 .629 .682
+
 
Industry: mining .527 .317 .378 .410 
Industry: construction 1.378** 1.115* .988* 1.071* 
Industry: transportation .495 .367 .394 .427 
Industry: wholesale .907* .669 .646 .701 
Industry: retail 1.119* .960* .962* 1.043* 
Marketing-related function
 b
 -.017 -.053 -.028 -.031 
Task conflict  .240** .245** .245** 
Relationship conflict  -.279** -.282** -.291** 
Social interaction  .142* .156* .153* 
Trust  .098 .111 .112 
H1:Task conflict x Social interaction   .269* .242* 
H2: Relationship conflict x Social 
interaction 
  -.256* -.247* 
H3: Task conflict x Trust   -.320* -.292* 
H4: Relationship conflict x Trust   .158 .148 
R
2 
∆R2 
.078 
 
.192 
.114 (p<.01) 
.233 
.041 (p<.05) 
- 
 
Notes:  Unstandardized coefficients (two-tailed p-values). 
**p < .01; *p < .05; 
+ 
p < .10. 
a
 Base case = Finance industry. 
b
 Base case = R&D-related function. 
c
 The fit indices of the structural equation model (SEM) are χ2(112) = 198.96, GFI = .92, TLI = .92, CFI = 
.95, RMSEA = .06
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FIGURE 1: Conceptual Model of the Interplay between Cross-
Functional Conflict and Cross-Functional Social Capital on Innovation 
 
 
 
FIGURE 3: Moderating Effect of Social Interaction on the Relationship 
Conflict–Innovation Relationship 
 
 
FIGURE 2: Moderating Effect of Social Interaction on the Task 
Conflict–Innovation Relationship 
 
FIGURE 4: Moderating Effect of Trust on the Task Conflict–
Innovation Relationship 
 
